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AbstractUN peace operations have increasingly focused on the importance of "local ownership." The logic is simple. For peace operations to succeed in helping war-torn states to create accountable, democratic institutions grounded in the rule of law, peace operations need to internalize democratic principles by making UN missions accountable to different domestic constituencies—crossing ethnic, religious, racial, social, and gender lines—within the war-torn country. As part of a special issue on "The United Nations at Seventy-Five: Looking Back to Look Forward," this essay argues that while there is widespread consensus among UN member states and UN bureaucrats that local ownership is necessary, UN peace operations have faced significant obstacles to creating true local ownership. These obstacles include the UN's focus on host-government ownership; the challenge of creating trust with different domestic constituencies that represent diverse perspectives; the supply-driven nature of UN intervention; and the mismatch between the UN's ideal post-conflict state and the preferences of post-conflict societies. To make UN peace operations more responsive to post-conflict societies, UN staff often have to bend or break rules established only to hold them accountable to their member states.

Despite considerable attention given to professionalising methods and analysing best practices, peacebuilding organisations (i.e. any organisation aiming to impact the causes of peace) continue to have difficulty understanding and demonstrating their collective and individual impact. This article argues that this is in part due to the barriers they encounter in organisational learning. To impact the causes of peace, peacebuilding organisations have to learn what works in each conflict context. To improve their chances at learning, peacebuilding organisations have to measure and understand their successes and failures. As a result, this article argues, peacebuilding organisations' learning processes have an important role in determining their capacity to identify and influence the causes of peace in countries emerging from violent conflict.

Despite considerable attention given to professionalising methods and analysing best practices, peacebuilding organisations (i.e. any organisation aiming to impact the causes of peace) continue to have difficulty understanding and demonstrating their collective and individual impact. This article argues that this is in part due to the barriers they encounter in organisational learning. To impact the causes of peace, peacebuilding organisations have to learn what works in each conflict context. To improve their chances at learning, peacebuilding organisations have to measure and understand their successes and failures. As a result, this article argues, peacebuilding organisations' learning processes have an important role in determining their capacity to identify and influence the causes of peace in countries emerging from violent conflict. Adapted from the source document.

About the Editors; About the Contributors; Introduction: The Politics of Liberal Peace; Chapter Breakdown; Conclusion; Bibliography; PART I Introducing the Debate; 1 The Liberal Peace? An Intellectual History of International Conflict Management, 1990-2010; UN Peacebuilding, the Early Years: From Social Justice to State Collapse; Managing Global Chaos? The Emergence of a Field; Institutionalisation: The Turn to Governance, Responsibility and Transitional Administration; Turbulent Peace? Reconciliation and Healing in the Wake of Conflict.